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TRANSPORTATION AND
TRANSFORMATION
THE HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY, 1857 .. 1885

A. A. DEN OTTER

efficiency of its transportation system enabled
the company to defeat all challengers, including the Montreal traders, who were absorbed in
1821. Starving the competition by slashing
prices, trading liquor, and deploying its best
servants to critical areas were other tactics the
company employed to preserve its fur empire. 1
The principal means by which the Hudson's
Bay Company defended its trade monopoly,
nevertheless, was to maintain an efficient transportation system into Rupert's Land.
By the 1850s the company's policy of controlling access to its fur preserve faced an
entirely new and potentially fatal challenge.
Settlement, with technology based on an expanding agricultural-industrial economy, was
rapidly approaching the undeveloped plains.
The economic activities of this encroaching
civilization foretold death for the fur trade.
Several fur empires in other parts of North
America had already yielded to the relentless
advance of settlement; company officials knew
that theirs would also eventually succumb. As
early as 1849 Peter Skene Ogden, the chief
factor in Oregon, wrote George Simpson, the
resident governor of the Hudson's Bay Company, "You are I presume fully aware that the
fur trade and civilization can never blend

Lansportation was a prime consideration in
the business policies of the Hudson's Bay Company from its inception. Although the company
legally enjoyed the position of monopoly by
virtue of the Royal Charter of 1670, which
granted to the Hudson's Bay Company the
Canadian territory called Rupert's Land, this
privilege had to be defended from commercial
intruders. From the earliest days the company
developed its own transportation network in
order to maintain a competitive edge over its
opponents. During its first century, when
business ventured hardly beyond the shores of
the Hudson Bay, the company perfected its
transatlantic shipping. Later, when competitors
from Montreal moved into the western interior,
the Hudson's Bay Company countered by opening several inland rivers, developing a unique
wooden craft, the Y orkboat, and constructing
rollered passage ways around several rapids. The
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together and experience teaches us that the
former invariably gives way to the latter.,,2
Understanding that the fall of the fertile
portion of Rupert's Land to agricultural settlement was inevitable, the Hudson's Bay Company developed a strategy to retain its hold
over the fur trade wherever possible and to
dominate the commercial potential of the new
economic order. 3 Accessibility was the key to
the survival plan; realizing that transportation
was the vanguard of the new civilization, the
company once again decided to control this
technology within its domain and to develop
it to the company's own advantage.
The most obvious legal threat to the company's charter came from the province of
Canada. This British colony could claim historical, imperial, and juridical ties with Rupert's
Land. During the 1850s, however, the provincial government did not press claims to the
territories. The editor of the Toronto Globe,
George Brown, tried to rally his readers to the
cause of western annexation-for years his
strident editorials praised the Northwest as a
panacea for the stagnating economy of Upper
Canada-but his proposal remained a minor
issue even in his own Clear Grit party and was
dismissed as unimportant by the Montreal
press. 4 In 1857 a legislative committee, established to investigate the worrisome emigration
of young Canadians to the United States, completely ignored the prairies as a haven for prospective farmers and urged instead that they be
retained in Canada by means of a vigorous
industrialization policy. 5 That same year
Canada's position at the British parliamentary
inquiry into the Hudson's Bay Company license
was timid and noncommittal. Canada simply
could not afford to buyout the company's
charter and trading rights nor could it finance
the administration of such a vast domain. 6
Overshadowing these political considerations
was a formidable geographical barrier. Eight
hundred miles of uninhabitable swamps, forests,
and hills separated Canada from the fertile
prairies. Although several Canadian enthusiasts
proposed grandiose schemes to bridge the
Canadian Shield, none were able to gather

enough support to construct an efficient, profitable system of transportation. Of all the
projects, only the North West Transportation,
Navigation, and Railway Company was put into
operation. In summer 1858 the firm inaugurated an agonizingly slow mail and transport
link between Canada and the prairies. But the
next year, when the Hudson's Bay Company
withdrew its cooperation, the attempt collapsed. 7 The eastern approach to the company's
empire was safe for the time being.
On the southern flank, however, the situation was radically different. In the United
States, entrepreneurs had backed the new
steampower technology with enough capital
to fuel a transportation revolution. Throughout
the 1850s innovative promoters utilized steamboats and railways to open the interior of the
continent. Early in the decade, after American
railways reached the Mississippi River, merchants in Saint Paul, Minnesota, began to combine river and rail to transport their merchandise. In this way they doubled the length of the
shipping season and, by using carts north of
the city, penetrated deep into the territory
monopolized by the Hudson's Bay Company.
By 1854 they were at the gates of the rich
Athabasca district. 8
The company responded by improving the
river route from York Factory on the Hudson
Bay, but by 1857 the northern route was too
slow and the required labor too expensive to
compete with the Saint Paul approach. Moreover, it could not manage the rapidly increasing
traffic load. Consequently, in 1858, Governor
George Simpson authorized a trial shipment of
soap and sugar via Saint Paul. The experiment
was successful and saved the company considerable time and money.9
The company's move spurred the Saint Paul
merchants to greater efforts. In 1859 the newly
formed Saint Paul chamber of commerce offered one thousand dollars to the first captain
to steam a vessel down the Red River of the
North to Fort Garry. Captain Anson Northup
took up the challenge: he carted a dismantled
stern-wheeler from the Mississippi to the
Red River, reassembled it inside a new hull,
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christened the vessel the Anson Northup, and
on 10 June 1859, reached Fort Garry.1 0 The
settlement bells and cannons that welcomed the
Anson Northup signalled a serious breach in the
transportation monopoly of the Hudson's Bay
Company.
The company responded to the threat by
buying Northup's steamer. Possession of his
vessel, however, did not mean complete control
over the Red River, because American law
prohibited foreign companies from owning
property in the United States. To circumvent

this law, the company worked out a secret
partnership with the Saint Paul firm of R. C.
and J. C. Burbank. The Minnesota company
agreed to carry Hudson's Bay Company goods
overland with carts from Saint Paul to Georgetown on the Red River, and with two steamers
(the Anson Northup, refurbished and renamed
the Pioneer, and the International) to Fort
Garry. The Burbanks retained the right to carry
free-trade goods, but at substantially higher
prices. l1 Governor Simpson reported on what
appeared to be a satisfactory arrangement:
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FIG. 1. The Anson Northup, first steamer on the Red River, from an engraving in The Win-

nipeg Country, 1859. Manitoba Archives.

Our overland transport is likely to work
quite a revolution in the business & be attended with economy & other advantagesBy getting in abundant supplies, with dispatch & at a reduced rate we are able to
drive the free traders & Americans out of the
field, & to turn our position to account, by
effecting large sales at remunerative rates.
With proper energy in our arrangements, I
feel satisfied we can hold the command of
the trade against all the world. 12
Despite the obvious advantages of the Minnesota route, the arrangements with the Burbanks were not satisfactory. The American
partners were primarily interested in general
trade and therefore actively promoted the
settlement of the plains. This fundamental
conflict of interests led to numerous squabbles
and disagreements; thus, when the Sioux uprisings blocked the Minnesota route in 1863,

the companies broke their pact. 13 A subsequent contract with another American firm
also failed and so the company undertook its
own freighting operations under the name of its
agent, Norman W. Kittson. Low waters allowed
only intermittent use of the steamers, but even
when the boats were supplemented with Red
River carts, the company realized significant
savings. By the end of the decade, the Minnesota route was an important addition to the
Hudson Bay ports and the company had retained control over a vital access to its empire. 14
Soon after the company's officers had
neutralized the encroachment of Saint Paul
business interests, they became involved in an
attempt by several British financiers to open
communications with the Northwest and to
develop its fertile soil. Edward Watkin, the
president of Canada's ailing Grand Trunk
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Railway, initiated the move. An idealistic
visionary, Watkin proposed to save his company
from collapse by incorporating the existing
lines of the Grand Trunk into a transcontinental railway through British North America. To
facilitate the plan, he also suggested the unification of British North America, the annexation
of the Northwest, and the settlement of the prairies.1S As the first step Watkin organized the Atlantic and Pacific Postal and Telegraph Company
to build a telegraph line across the continent. He
petitioned the colonial office for a subsidy and
the Hudson's Bay Company for a vaguely defined
but broad right-of-way. The government emphatically refused his request but the company
tentatively agreed to a very narrow thoroughfare.
To Watkin's surprise, company officials hinted
that he should buy up all the company's shares
and thus control its policies directly.1 6
Watkin leaped at the opportunity and by the
summer of 1863 had worked out an arrangement to buy the Hudson's Bay Company. To
finance the purchase, he turned to the International Financial Society, an association formed
by London bankers to make investments across
the globe.17 One of the society'S first purchases
was a majority of the shares of the Hudson's
Bay Company. Thus, on 15 June 1863, this influential society named a new board of governors
for the old, closed company and for the first
time put its stock on the open market. Although
the deal was primarily a lucrative refinancing
operation, a society brochure spoke in glowing
terms of the settlement potential of the Northwest while scarcely mentioning the enormous
cost of establishing communications or civil
government in the territories. 18 The brochure
marked the dramatic change in a fundamental
policy of the Hudson's Bay Company: instead of
blocking the approach of settlement, the company, under its new management, intended to
establish modern communications in its territories and to control the development of resources.
Colonizing the southwestern portion of
Rupert's Land was a venture beset by complex
political considerations and costly long-term
investments, and Watkin was moving too quickly for the cautious London bankers. Already in

July 1863 he was in Canada negotiating a deal
whereby the Montreal Telegraph Company
would undertake the construction of a telegraph line from Halifax to Sault Ste. Marie if the
Hudson's Bay Company would complete a line
from Fort Langley to Pembina by way of Fort
Garry. Watkin proposed that either the Canadian
government subsidize the Fort Garry and Sault
Ste. Marie section or his company would utilize
existing American telegraph lines south of the
Great Lakes. Confident of success, Watkin authorized D. S. Wood of the Montreal Telegraph
Company to construct the line from Fort Garry
to Jasper House under a Hudson's Bay Company
contract. Although all these proposals awaited
the approval of the governing committee, Watkin
placed a provisional order for copper wire. 19
Watkin's enthusiasm temporarily overwhelmed
the committee, and although angry about his
unauthorized actions, it approved his order for
nearly two hundred tons of copper wire to be
delivered to several points in the Northwest. 20
The committee's move was especially precipitous, because the Canadian government had just
refused to make any financial commitments for
western communications. More ominously,
Canada was once again challenging the validity
of the company's charter; soon the telegraph
project was lost in the prolonged and complex
debate about the future of Rupert's Land.
The negotiations that led to the termination of the Hudson's Bay Company's charter
consumed more than a decade. All parties involved agreed that Canada should control at
least the fertile portion of Rupert's Land, but
they could not concur on the terms of the
transfer. Company officials wanted as large an
indemnity for the charter as they could get,
while Canadian politicians refused to payout
large sums of money for the territories or
assume the enormous cost of administering and
settling the region without a substantial imperial
subsidy. The British negotiators, hamstrung by
the chaotic politics of the period, knew that
Parliament would not approve expenditures for
the economic benefit of a colony nor would it
defend the rights of an anachronistic fur monopoly. The result was a war of words, couched
in diplomacy and fought with memoranda.
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Time and circumstance were on the side
of the colonial office. The rapid influx of
settlers into Minnesota and the Dakotas threatened to spill over into Canada. Indeed, several
influential Americans were calling for the
annexation of Rupert's Land to the United
States. In Ontario, meanwhile, political pressure
was mounting for the Canadian government to
act quickly to reserve the Northwest for Canadians. The Hudson's Bay Company realized that
it had lost administrative control over the territories and would eventually lose economic
dominance over at least the fertile portion. The
colonial office, using these conditions to its
advantage, gradually whittled down the extreme positions of both sides and in March
1869 imposed a settlement. In exchange for
ceding Rupert's Land to Canada, the company woula retain title to some land surrounding its posts and to one-twentieth of the land in
the fertile belt, receiving a compensation of
three hundred thousand pounds. The Canadian
government quickly accepted the settlement,
but the Hudson's Bay Company acquiesced
only after unsuccessfully seeking some major
.
. h
21
Improvements
In t e terms.
The company's surrender of the charter
meant the defeat of the colonizers among its
shareholders. For the past five years, Edward
Watkin and his supporters had tried to transform a fur-trade business into a huge colonization company.22 They failed because, as Sir
Stafford Northcote, the governor, explained,
private corporations no longer possessed the
moral authority to maintain law and government in a populated region. Without properly
constituted civil administration and law courts,
the company dared not even sell land, especiallyon credit. Moreover, the governor pointed
out, the Hudson's Bay Company did not command the resources to finance the infrastructure-government, telegraphs, railways, and
warehouses-necessary to support colonization. 23 The settlement of 1869 decided abandonment of colonization.
The loss of the charter significantly altered
the position of the Hudson's Bay Company.
Although the charter had never prevented the

incursion of free traders, its abrogation opened
the territories to all business interests as well as
settlers. Throughout the negotiations, senior
company officials had debated among themselves "the future position of the company
with reference not only to its business as a fur
trade company but with reference to its position as a great commercial company supplying
this settlement which is likely to be formed
with a view to dealing with the land that is left
to it, and with a view to its assisting in opening
up that country.,,24 By 1871 the Hudson's
Bay Company had decided not to abandon the
fur trade but to modernize its management.
The company also determined to capture a
large share of the general trade that would be
created by the settlement of the prairies. But,
as Governor Northcote cautioned the company's shareholders, profits would dwindle
unless the company offset the shrewd business
practices of its competitors. The only advantage the company had, according to Northcote,
was its expertise in wilderness transportation.
It was time, he declared, to streamline all parts
of the company's transportation system in
order to preserve its dominant place in the commerce of the Northwest. 25
Northcote's call for the modernization of
the company's transportation system carried a
note of urgency. Several railways were already
approaching its business empire. In 1871 the
Northern Pacific reached the Red River from its
terminal at Duluth; the same year, the St. Paul
and Pacific arrived at the river from Saint Paul.
The St. Paul and Pacific planned to push northward as far as the international border at
Pembina and asked the Hudson's Bay Company
to complete the line to Fort Garry.26 The company's chief commissioner, Donald Smith,
petitioned the Canadian government for a
charter to construct a railway from Pembina to
Fort Garry and thence to Fort William on Lake
Superior. Parliament never considered the
charter, probably because the administration
was then planning the Canadian transcontinental railway. 27 Financial difficulties further
hampered the St. Paul and Pacific's plans, and
in 1873 the railroad went into receivership
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along with the Northern Pacific. Despite their
financial problems, the two railways provided
western businesses with fast and efficient
transportation between the head of navigation
of the Red River and all major eastern American and Canadian cities.
Meanwhile, steamboat transportation on
the Red River also improved. In 1871 James J.
Hill, an ambitious partner of the Saint Paul firm
of Hill, Griggs and Company, launched the
Selkirk on the river. After the Hudson's Bay
Company refused to pay his high rates, Hill
declared that American law permitted only
domestic ships to ply the rivers of the United
States. The British-owned Hudson's Bay Company successfully thwarted Hill by transferring
the ownership of the International to its
agent, Norman Kittson, an American citizen.
Competition, however, served only to reduce
rates and profits; therefore, in 1872 the two
rivals founded the Red River Transportation
Company, which set preferential tariffs for the
Hudson's Bay Company and ruled the river
virtually unchallenged until 1878. The consolidation of'the two competitors proved to be an
extremely lucrative transportation monopoly.
In 1878, for example, the Red River Transportation Company paid a dividend of 80 percent
to all its shareholders, including the Hudson's
Bay Company.28
The introduction of reliable train and
steamship service to Fort Garry forced the
Hudson's Bay Company to undertake a comprehensive renovation of its transport network. As
long as the company had held imperial sway
over the unsettled expanse of Rupert's Land, it
could safely neglect to revamp its interior
transportation system. But with the modernization of the Red River route, the company
could no longer afford to rely on old carrying
methods. The complex Yorkboat shuttle from
the fur-trading posts York Factory or Moose
Factory on the Hudson Bay, or from Fort
Garry via Norway House to the outlying plains
and forests of the Northwest, was too slow and
expensive. At best, four years were required to
realize a return on capital invested in trade
goods. In 1869 and again in 1870, valuable furs

had been left to winter in the country, accumulating interest charges and eroding profits.
Moreover, this fragile system of moving goods
depended upon Indians and metis, who were
expensive to pay and feed and difficult to recruit for the backbreaking work. 29
To meet the challenge of improved rail and
river transportation and increased competition,
the Hudson's Bay Company attempted to reduce operating costs by using its own fleet of
steamships on Lake Winnipeg and the Saskatchewan River. In May 1872 it launched the
Chief Commissioner, but the boat was ill suited
for the rough waters of Lake Winnipeg and
was retired only three years later. The next year
an unnamed boat foundered on the first rapids
it encountered on the Saskatchewan River. 30
Undeterred by these misfortunes, the company
commissioned the Colville to replace the Chief
Commissioner on Lake Winnipeg and built the
Northcote to ply the Saskatchewan. The Northcote, a Mississippi River type of stern-wheeler,
reached Carlton House late in 1874. 31 The
following summer, even though the company
still needed to deploy the traditional flotilla
of Y orkboats for the bulk of its trade goods
and supplies, the steamers demonstrated their
cost efficiency and the company nearly recovered its investment. 32
As the general economic depression of the
1870s drove down fur prices, Hudson's Bay
Company officials were more determined than
ever to cut their transport expenses. The firm
built a 3Yz-mile tramway around the Grand
Rapids as an efficient traI)sshipping point between Lake Winnipeg and the Saskatchewan
River. The company also planned to place
steamers on the Clearwater and Athabasca
rivers in its far northern domain and worked to
improve several portages and overland routes. 33
In 1876 the company purchased the Lily from
a Clyde shipyard and carried it in sections to
the Northwest. The Lily, which was equipped
with a steel hull as a protection against rocks,
had a deeper draft than intended. Ironically,
it often grounded on the shallow river bottom
and in 1883 hit a rock near Medicine Hat
and sank. 34 The Northcote, although better
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designed, also experienced difficulties navigating the shallow Saskatchewan. By the end of
the decade, modern steamship technology had
not yet conquered the capricious northern
rivers.
It was apparent that the Saskatchewan
River's channel required extensive modifications before it could serve as an efficient waterway for the company's steamboats. The task
fell to C. J. Brydges, who in 1879 was appointed
the company's land commissioner as part of a
general shake-up of the senior administration. 35
Brydges lobbied the Canadian government to
remove the most troublesome boulders from
various rapids and to build warping piers and
wingdams at several small waterfalls on the
Saskatchewan. Despite his close friendship with
such leading politicians as Prime Minister John
A. Macdonald, Brydges had little success. All
he gained was the reimbursement of the twentyfive thousand dollars his company had spent in
1882 and 1883 on a haphazard boulder removal
program. The federal government subsequently
spent another thirty-five thousand dollars on
the river. 36 Compared to the massive subsidies
to railroads, the expenditures on navigational
improvements were minuscule and clearly betrayed the government's priorities.
To back his lobbying efforts, Brydges committed the Hudson's Bay Company to a substantial expansion in its steamboat operations.
If the government would agree to underwrite
the river improvements, then Brydges promised
not only to open the company's ships to public
traffic but to increase the size of the fleet. 37
Brydges's pledge marked a significant change in
company policy because the boats had been
built primarily for the company's own benefit,
to cripple the opposition. Brydges, however,
saw the issue from a different perspective. He
explained his view to the governor's committee.
"Unless the company is prepared to make its
boats available for public traffic and especially
in regards for the Indian department, ... there
will undoubtedly be an opposition line of boats
put upon the river, which will have the effect of
opening up the whole of the northern country
for supplies for fur trading purposes in direct

OpposltlOn to the Hudson's Bay Company.,,38
The argument was not lost on the board. Indeed, Chief Commissioner James A. Grahame,
the executive largely responsible for steamboat
policy, had on occasion permitted the fleet to
carry public goods. But, because present vessels
could not handle even all of the Hudson's Bay
Company's requirements, he realized that
creating a general steam transport system would
require expensive investments in new ships.
That was a task few committee members
wanted to take on, particularly at a time when
a prolonged economic depression had seriously
eroded fur prices. The committee emphatically warned Brydges not to undertake major
investments to expand the fleet. 39
Brydges's fears of competing steamboats
were well founded-and a direct result of the
continuing expansion of the railroads in the
1870s. In 1877 Donald A. Smith and James J.
Hill, with the cooperation of George Stephen,
the president of the Bank of Montreal, and
John S. Kennedy, a prominent New York
l:anker, had gained control of the assets of the
bankrupt St. Paul and Pacific Railroad. The
following year they completed the road to
Winnipeg (formerly Fort Garry) and renamed it
the St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Manitoba Railroad. 40 The establishment of a rail link between
Winnipeg and Saint Paul rendered the Red
River steamboat service obsolete. Thus, in 1878
the Red River Transportation Company sold
the bulk of its fleet to the Winnipeg and Western Transportation Company, formed by a
group of Montreal, Winnipeg, and Saint Paul
businessmen to operate the ships on the Assiniboine River. Late in 1879, however, Hill, Smith,
and Stephen became the principal members
of the Canadian Pacific Railway Syndicate,
founded to build Canada's transcontinental
railway. When the Canadian Pacific decided to
build its mainline through the southern portion
of the prairies, parallel to the Assiniboine, the
Winnipeg and Western Transportation Company
planned to transfer its ships to the Saskatchewan River. 41 Meanwhile, a second firm, called
the North West Navigation Company, formed
in 1880 by Montreal, Winnipeg, and Scottish
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FIG. 2. The Hudson's Bay Company's steamer North West, moored at Edmonton, 1896.
E. Brown Collection, Provincial Archives of Alberta.

financiers, also proposed to place several steamers on the river, as well as on Lake Winnipeg. 42
To meet the threat of competition, Grahame
and Brydges sold the Hudson's Bay Company
fleet to the two newcomers, used the revenue
from the sale to buy a majority interest in both
companies, and early in 1881 concluded a
freighting agreement to their mutual advantage.
The collusion limited the operations of the
Winnipeg and Western Transportation Company
to the Saskatchewan River and those of the
North West Navigation Company to Lake Winnipeg. Both firms agreed to grant the Hudson's
Bay Company a 10 percent rebate on their
freight rates. 43 Therefore, with no heavy capital expenditures for ship construction, Grahame
and Brydges created a transportation monopoly
on both Lake Winnipeg and the Saskatchewan
River, won a preferential position for the Hudson's Bay Company, maintained general control
over a fleet of five river and three lake steamers,
and delegated daily management responsibilities
to experienced personnel.

The monopoly was not as profitable as the
collaborators had envisioned. Without extensive
work on the falls and rapids of the Saskatchewan River, which Brydges had so strenuously
promoted earlier, navigation was not reliable.
Moreover, because water levels on the river
remained low for the next few years, the
Winnipeg and Western Transportation Company
consistently failed to deliver vital supplies to
the small communities along the Saskatchewan
River. These shortfalls caused hardships among
the settlers and destroyed the confidence of
retailers. 44 Increasingly, western merchants
turned to the Canadian Pacific Railway, which
was then being laid across the prairies. Even the
Hudson's Bay Company deserted the steamboats : in 1884 and 1885 the company shipped
most of its Edmonton and some of its Mackenzie and Athabasca outfits with the Pacific
railway via Calgary. 45 Although the overland
route was more costly, it was much faster and
finally enabled the company to distribute its
trade goods within a single season. In a highly
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FIG. 3. The Canadian Pacific Railway's Countess of Dufferin arrives by steamer in Winnipeg,
1877. Manitoba Archives.

competitive business based on luxury goods and
fluctuating prices, speed and reliability were
absolute requirements for success. The river
steamers delivered neither, and over the years
they were phased out of existence, replaced
by the more efficient railroads.
Although the steamboat program represented a last-ditch effort to control access to
the fur domain, the company finally surrendered its transportation monopoly to the controller of a more modern technology. Railway
technology was beyond the financial resources
of the Hudson's Bay Company. The company
could not afford to purchase a controlling
interest in such large enterprises as the St. Paul
and Pacific and the Canadian Pacific railways,
nor could it generate the traffic to warrant
such massive investments. Railways, unlike
steamboats, could not be used to shut competitors out of its fur domain. In fact, railways

depended on expanding commerce and growing settlement, the very antithesis of the best
conditions for the fur trade. For the first time,
the Hudson's Bay Company lost control over
the transportation of its trade goods, one of the
most vital aspects of its operations.
The construction of the Canadian Pacific
Railway completed the transformation of the
Hudson's Bay Company from a privileged
monopoly to a diversified business struggling
to be competitive. The London committee
abolished the post of chief commissioner and
created a subcommittee of two Canadian residents to oversee the entire Canadian operations.
The committee also appointed Joseph Wrigley
to the new chief executive post of trade commissioner. 46 Wrigley was keenly aware of how
drastically the Canadian Pacific had altered the
business environment in western Canada, and
he believed that the change should be harnessed
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for the benefit of the Hudson's Bay Company.
"I would suggest," he wrote, "that the company should endeavour to adopt its business to
altered circumstances and make vigorous effort
not only to hold its own, but to advance and
try to increase in the north the collection of
Furs, and in the south general business.,,47
Wrigley's northern policy emphasized cost
reductions and modern business techniques,
particularly necessary because by 1885 fur
prices had fallen to all-time lows. Since demand
was not likely to grow, but competition would,
productivity had to be increased. The railway
mad~ Wrigley's task easier because he could
instruct the nearer districts to order merchandise twice a year instead of two years in advance as before. Careful inventory control
reduced capital investments, prevented the
buildup of unpopular stock, and broadened the
selection of goods. Wrigley also instructed all
posts and stores to adopt modern accounting
procedures and instituted a formal inspectorate
to ensure efficient operations. 48
The Hudson's Bay Company's southern
policy was more complex and aggressive. For
example, even as the Canadian Pacific Railway
advanced across the plains, the company expanded its bids on government supply contracts
to include the southwestern corner of the
Canadian prairies. Traditionally, two Fort Benton firms, I. G. Baker and Company and T. C.
Power and Brother, had dominated the region.
The Hudson's Bay Company had tolerated the
invasion of its commercial territory because its
supply lines could not equal the more efficient
Missouri River system. 49 By 1879 the situation
began to change. The Hudson's Bay Company's
fleet on the Saskatchewan River could tender
for Indian department contracts recently swollen by the privation among prairie Indians. The
company changed its policy and from 1880 on
annually captured most of the government's
business along the Saskatchewan. The southwestern area was left to the Fort Benton merchants because the company's overland system
still could not match their transport economy. 50
The arrival of the Canadian Pacific changed
even that approach. With freight expenses

dramatically reduced, the Hudson's Bay Company could tender for all government contracts
in the Northwest. 51
The ability to bid on all prairie contracts was
a mixed blessing. Since rail transportation
opened the hinterland to all companies, the
government began to parcel out its contracts
to various firms; in return, the increased competition lowered prices and profits. To meet the
new situation, the two Fort Benton firms
divided their American and Canadian government business between themselves, excluded
all opponents from their transport system, and
even equalized profits. 52 I. G. Baker, who had
taken the Canadian portion, approached the
Hudson's Bay Company for a similar division
of territory, but the latter company refused. 53
Although the Hudson's Bay Company still
viewed government contracts as "a delusion and
snare" because they diverted too much capital
and time from the regular trade, it nevertheless
determined to eliminate the American firm
from its traditional domain. 54 The company
enjoyed the significant advantages of size,
British connections, and all-Canadian transport,
and eventually squeezed I. G. Baker out of the
government supply business.
The Hudson's Bay Company also clashed
with the I. G. Baker firm in the retail trade. In
addition to its large department store in Winnipeg, the company operated smaller concerns at
Portage la Prairie and other Manitoba centers.
As the Canadian Pacific Railway moved westward, so did the company. In 1884, for example, the company built a warehouse and retail
store on several town lots purchased in Calgary.
It also constructed a small outlet at Battle River
Crossing north of Calgary specifically to compete with I. G. Baker. In fact, the company
intended to drive the American firm south of
the Canadian Pacific mainline. That objective
was not lost on the Fort Benton merchants.
I. G. Baker and Company offered to sell its
Calgary store at a 40 percent discount on its
stock and promised not to open another establishment in Calgary or points north. The
Hudson's Bay Company accepted the offer with
only minor amendments. 55 The Calgary deal
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became the prelude to the eventual takeover of
all of I. G. Baker's Canadian operations.
One of the reasons the Hudson's Bay Company was able to beat the American competition was the special arrangement made with the
Canadian Pacific Railway. The company had
been able to wrest extra concessions from the
railroad because of the size of its shipments and
the long distances involved. In addition, Donald
Smith, the company's largest shareholder, was
also a Canadian Pacific director. Smith was
only one of the policy makers in the railway
corporation, however, and his railway ties
would preclude the company from using American rail lines to reach the Canadian Northwest.
Consequently, mutual interest suggested that
the company ship by steamer to Montreal, use
the Canadian Pacific to western Canadian
stations, and in return receive a modest rebate.
In June 1885 the Canadian Pacific secretly
granted the Hudson's Bay Company a 12Yz
percent rebate on all freight east of Winnipeg.
The Hudson's Bay Company had wanted to
include flour exports, but the railroad refused,
ostensibly because the rate on flour was already
low, but probably because it did not want to
give the company a special advantage on such
an important export item. 56 Nevertheless, the
agreement once again made Montreal the gateway to the Northwest.
The failure to secure a freight rate concession on flour shipments was a disappointment
to company officials. Although milling was
only an incidental part of the company's total
business, Trade Commissioner Wrigley planned
to test the Montreal and London markets in
the hope that flour sales would eventually replace the lost fur-trade revenues. Unfortunately,
the company's mills at Fort Garry and West
Lynne were badly outdated. Wrigley lamented
the fact that even the new mill at Prince Albert
was being built "on the old and nearly obsolete
[stone 1 principle" and feared that if anyone
erected a modern roller mill nearby, the company's plant would soon be out of business.
Despite the company's retrenchment program,
Wrigley strongly recommended that the board
install roller machinery at Prince Albert and

spend an additional twelve thousand dollars
to convert the Fort Garry mill. Although the
committee was initially reluctant, it finally
agreed that flour milling was potentially a big
money-maker and approved the modernization
of the two mills. 57
Flour milling was not the only avenue for
profit that the Canadian Pacific opened to the
Hudson's Bay Company. The start of prairie
construction sparked a real estate boom that
dramatically boosted the company's land sales.
Even though the land rush eventually collapsed,
sales continued, although at a slower pace. The
westward progress of the railway steadily increased land values and enhanced company
profits. The governing committee decided to
return the bonus revenues directly to shareholders by lowering the nominal value of company shares and by paying out the reduction in
cash. In this manner, the company wrote down
the value of its shares from twenty to thirteen
pounds and disbursed the seven hundred thousand pounds of profit its land account had
earned in the fifteen years after the surrender
of its charter. 58 Land sales promised to offset
the loss of the fur monopoly for the Hudson's
Bay Company after the opening of the Northwest by the Canadian Pacific.
The loss of the fur and transportation
monopoly, therefore, had nat adversely affected the balance sheet of the Hudson's Bay
Company. Rather, it was the general economic
depression of the 1870s and 1880s that caused
the company's lean years. Dwindling profits
coincided with a transformation in business
policies occasioned by a drastically changed
environment. Traditionally, the Hudson's Bay
Company had operated in splendid isolation,
countering challengers with a formal policy of
shrewd trading techniques on the fringes of its
fur empire and an implicit strategy of managing
transportation within this domain. The arrival
of fast and efficient means of transport made
its territory even more vulnerable to interlopers; consequently, restraint of access became
increasingly important. As long as the Hudson's
Bay Company was able to control the approaches to its business realm, it could to some
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extent manage its rate of development and curb
free trade. By making its own transportation
systems as efficient as possible, the company
could undercut opponents and prevent the rise
of competing systems. This had been the rationale for the company's Minnesota route, the
involvement with the Atlantic and Pacific
Postal and Telegraph Company, and the construction of the Saskatchewan River steamboats. By 1880, with the advent of western
Canadian railways, the company's transportation monopoly disintegrated. The Hudson's
Bay Company could not afford the enormous
investment that railroad technology required;
therefore, the company could no longer transport its own trade goods and supplies. Yet,
even as the Canadian Pacific ended the fur-trade
era on the prairies and contiguous forest, the
railroad also ushered in a new age for the Hudson's Bay Company. Access to the far northern
fur forest was cheapened and the company
became more competitive on the world market.
In the south the railway opened new opportunities in land sales, retailing, government
supply contracts, and flour milling. Backed by
a centuries-old business, newly appointed managers readily adjusted the company to the new
order.
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